- #IDA PRO 7.0 ALL DECOMPILERS FULL LEAK PASS QY2JTS9HEJGY INSTALL#
- #IDA PRO 7.0 ALL DECOMPILERS FULL LEAK PASS QY2JTS9HEJGY FULL#
Discarding the first generated number after setting the seed was everything that had to be changed to make it work (with DRand48): for i in pos. It probably was a well-educated guess by hishe that led to IDA 7.2 being finally pried open. The second hint was posted as a small inconspicuous reply in the comments section on the devco.re blog post, by hishe: The first one was pretty simple, checking if the password length was increased to 14 characters, which sadly was not the case. Lumina server The Lumina server holds metadata (names, prototypes, operand types, ) about a large number of well-known functions and helps improve the disassembly listing through users’ search. SDK is available for all registered IDA users. On the next morning a lot of comments on both devco.re and the chinese discussion board had appeared, pointing to a few more ideas to test. IDA’s functionalities can be easily extended by the use of programmable plug-ins. Giving up for the night I've shared my findings as a reply to qudiss' comment. I've tried both the DRand48 PRNG and the older C-based PRNG, to no avail. This, converted to Rust, amounts to something like: use float_extras :: f64 ::ldexp pub struct DRand48 To do that I've dug through the Perl source code to find the exact implementation of DRand48.
#IDA PRO 7.0 ALL DECOMPILERS FULL LEAK PASS QY2JTS9HEJGY FULL#
I found that interesting and verified their findings by converting the code to Rust and do a full search for all PRNG seeds (assuming a 32-bit seed). I assume different algorithms/charsets/etc. I noticed Perl 5.20.0's PRNG implementation can't be used to find seeds for the other leaked passwords or to bruteforce IDA 7.0-7.2 setup passwords. This only works for versions up to 6.8 though, and not even all installers, as qudiss noted: Unless you find out how the passwords were generated in the first place! Devcore found out that the passwords are simply generated with a small Perl script using srand()/ rand(). The password being 12 alphanumeric characters long means that bruteforcing it is pretty much out of the question. InnoSetup encrypts the program data with the installer password and hashes it via SHA-1, prepending it with PasswordCheckHash and eight random bytes as salt. The Windows installer, however, uses InnoSetup as installation engine. On, devcore published a blog post about obvious flaws in the MacOS and Linux installers for IDA, including the password as plaintext in the setup file.
![ida pro 7.0 all decompilers full leak-pass-qy2jts9hejgy ida pro 7.0 all decompilers full leak-pass-qy2jts9hejgy](https://www.cnponer.com/usr/themes/handsome/usr/img/sj2/7.jpg)
![ida pro 7.0 all decompilers full leak-pass-qy2jts9hejgy ida pro 7.0 all decompilers full leak-pass-qy2jts9hejgy](https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1326850580594249728/na_UfsDS_400x400.jpg)
Separately to that, a license file from ESET was leaked, which didn't match the feature set of the installer file.īut all the leaks didn't matter, because without the installer password, the program files were safe.
#IDA PRO 7.0 ALL DECOMPILERS FULL LEAK PASS QY2JTS9HEJGY INSTALL#
This does not mean it was usable however, as you need an installer password to install and a licence file to activate it. In January 2019, the installer files for IDA 7.2 were leaked. Note: All hashes and passwords are redacted. Posted: How IDA 7.2's installer password was found